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712 LEO v. DuNHAM [41 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 22613. In Bank. Dec. 4, 1953.] 
W. A. LEO, Appellant, v. RUFUS ALBERTSON DUNHAM, 
Respondent. 
[1] Negligence- Emergency or Sudden Peril.- A person who 
without negligence on his part is suddenly and unexpectedly 
confronted with peril, arising from either actual presence or 
appearance of imminent danger to himself or to others, is not 
expected nor required to use same judgment and prudence 
that is required of him in exercise of ordinary care in calmer 
and more deliberate moments. 
[2] Trial-Instructions-Applicability to Pleadings and Issues.-
An instruction should be given only when it is applicable to 
issues raised by pleadings or is pertinent to some issue or 
theory developed by evidence. 
[3] Negligence-Emergency or Sudden PeriL-Ordinarily, whether 
a person has been suddenly confronted with imminent peril 
is a question of fact to be submitted to jury. 
[ 4] !d.-Anticipating Negligence.-Generally, every person has a 
right to presume that every other person will perform his duty 
and obey the law, and in absence of :reasonable ground to 
think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that he is not 
exposed to danger which comes to him only from violation of 
law or duty by such other person. 
[5] Automobiles-Acts in Emergencies.-A reasonably prudent per-
son might anticipate an existent danger from approach of a 
truck only 300 feet away at time he started to cross a street 
and would not thereafter ignore its presence, and truck driver 
therefore might reasonably expect such pedestrian to take 
further care for his own safety by again looking toward ap-
proaching truck during the crossing; hence, it cannot be said, 
as a matter of law, that truck driver was negligent in failing to 
anticipate until truck was some 60 or SO feet from pedestrian 
that pedestrian was not going to yield right of way, at which 
instant truck driver may be said to have been confronted un-
expectedly with a sudden and imminent peril and a deliberately 
calculated and cool choice was no longer possible, thereby 
affording an adequate basis for an instruction on imminent 
peril. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Negligence,§ 38; Am.Jur., Negligence,§ 41. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Trial, § 94; Am.Jur., Trial, § 574 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negligence, § 30; [2] Trial, § 156; 
[3] Negligence, § 29; [4] Negligence, § 43(3); [5] Automobiles, 
§ 114. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Clarke E. Stephens, Judge pro tern.* Af-
firmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained by pedes-
trian in an automobile accident. Judgment for defendant 
affirmed. 
A. J. O'Connor and H. K. Lyle for Appellant. 
Bauder, Gilbert, Thompson & Kelly and Jean Wunderlich 
for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-A Ford tank truck operated by Rufus 
A. Dunham struck and seriously injured Willard A. Leo. 
Upon his appeal from the judgment in favor of Dunham, 
Leo charges that the instructions to the jury upon the doctrine 
of imminent peril were prejudically erroneous. 
The accident occurred when Leo walked across a highway 
running north and south. On each side of the highway, 
which had lanes 10 feet in width, there was a 6-foot improved 
· shoulder but no curbs. As Leo started to cross from east to 
west, he looked to his right and observed Dunham's truck 
approaching in the far lane and about 300 feet to the north. 
Upon the assumption that he had time to cross the highway, 
Leo attempted to do so, and did not thereafter look in the 
direction of the approaching vehicle. 
In the meantime, Dunham saw Leo begin to walk across 
the highway, looking in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, 
Dunham continued his approach at about 35 miles per hour, 
but not until he had reached a point some 60 or 80 feet 
away did he conclude that a collision was imminent. He 
applied his brakes, ''hollered,'' and swerved to his right. Leo 
did not look around until the truck suddenly ''showed up in 
front" of him. In fact, there is evidence that he walked 
into the side of the truck. 
The point of impact is the subject of some uncertainty. 
Dunham testified that the collision occurred ''six feet west of 
the westerly edge of the traveled portion of the highway." 
Leo told the jury that he was in the left-hand lane of traffic 
at the time he was struck. The traffic officer who investigated 
the accident also placed Leo in that lane at the time of the 
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council. 
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collision. According to the officer, the point of impact was 
one foot east of the west line of the left lane. 
The jury was given the usual instructions concerning negli-
gence, contributory negligence and proximate cause. In addi-
tion, at the request of Dunham, the rule as to the doctrine of 
imminent peril was stated. 
The doctrine has been variously characterized as the "sud-
den peril rule" (De Ponce v. Systern Freight Service, 66 Cal. 
App.2d 295, 301 [152 P.2d 234] ; Uhl v. Fertig, 56 Cal.App. 
718, 724 [ 206 P. 467] ) , the "imminent peril doctrine" (Stickel 
v. Durfee, 88 Cal.App.2d 402, 407 [199 P.2d 16]; Yates v. 
JJ1orotti, 120 Cal.App. 710,716 [8 P.2d 519] ), and the "emer-
gency doctrine" (Rest., Torts, vol. II, Negligence [1934] 
§ 296, p. 796; Prosser on Torts [1941] § 37, p. 242). [1] How-
ever, under the cases and the authorities, a person who, with-
out negligence on his part, is suddenly and unexpectedly con-
fronted with peril, arising from either the actual presence, 
or the appearance, of imminent danger to himself or to 
others, is not expected nor required to use the same judg-
ment and prudence that is required of him in the exercise of 
ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate moments. (Stickel 
v. Durfee, supra, pp. 407-408; Gamalia v. BadiUo, 53 Cal.App. 
2d 375, 378 [128 P.2d 184] ; Graham v. Consolidated JJ1. T. 
Co., 112 Cal.App. 648, 652 [297 P. 617] ; Rest., Torts, supra, 
vol. II, Negligence [1934] § 296, p. 796; Prosser on Torts, 
supra, [1941] § 37, p. 242; and see Bosserman v. Olmstead, 
77 Cal.App.2d 236, 240 [175 P.2d 49].) 
[2] An instruction should be given only when it is ap-
plicable to the issues raised by the pleadings or it is pertinent 
to some issue or theory developed by the evidence. (Sills v. 
Los Angeles Transit Lines, 40 Cal.2d 630, 633 [255 P.2d 795]; 
Garcia v. Conrad, 40 Cal.App.2d 167, 170 [104 P.2d 527]; 
Arundel v. Turk, 16 Cal.App.2d 293, 297 [60 P.2d 486] .) 
The decisive factor here is the time when Dunham knew, or 
should have known, that an accident would occur unless pre-
ventive steps were taken. Dunham takes the position that 
the evidence reasonably supports the inference that he was 
suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with an emergency 
when, for the first time, he realized that Leo would not keep 
out of the line of the truck's travel. As he presents the facts, 
it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that he had previously 
been guilty of any negligence. Under such circumstances, 
he says, he is entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of imminent 
peril. 
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Leo argues that there was nothing sudden or unexpected 
about his own conduct, and Dunham's "sudden realization" 
was in fact nothing more than belated awareness of an error 
in judgment. Dunham's responsibility, it is argued, is de-
termined by his conduct viewed in its entirety from the 
moment he first sighted Leo and continuing until the collision. 
Based upon that premise, Leo asserts, any imminent peril was 
occasioned by Dunham's negligence, and the doctrine is in-
applicable. 
[3] Ordinarily, whether a person has been suddenly con-
fronted with imminent peril is a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury. (Kehlor v. Satterlee, 37 Cal.App.2d 116, 
119 [98 P.2d 759] ; and see De Ponce v. Systern Freight Ser-
vice, supra, p. 3ell.) Although the evidence here justifies an 
inference of negligence on the part of Dunham, it also reason-
ably supports the jury's implied finding that he was not negli-
gent until the time he concluded that Leo was not going to 
look around again. (Of. Varner v. Skov, 20 Cal.App.2d 232, 
238 [67 P.2d 123] .) Both parties saw each other when they 
were 300 feet apart. Leo was crossing a roadway at a point 
not within a marked crosswalk nor within an unmarked cross-
walk at an intersection. Dunham had the right of way. (Veh. 
Code, § 562 [a].) [ 4] "The general rule is that every per-
son has a right to presume that every other person will 
perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of 
reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to 
assume that he is not exposed to danger which comes to him 
only from violation of law or duty by such other person.'' 
(Harris v. Johnson, 174 Cal. 55, 58 [161 P. 1155, Ann.Cas. 
1918E 560, L.R.A. 1917C 477] ; Dickinson v. Pacific Grey-
lWttnd Lines, 55 Cal.App.2d 824, 827 [131 P.2d 401]; and 
see Folger v. Richfield Oil Gorp., 80 Cal.App.2d 655, 665 [182 
P.2d 337] .) [5] Moreover, a reasonably prudent person might 
well anticipate an existent danger from the approach of a 
truck only 300 feet away at the time he started to cross a 
street and would not thereafter ignore its presence. (Fisch.er 
v. Keen, 43 Cal.App.2d 244, 249 [110 P.2d 693].) Dunham, 
therefore, reasonably might have expected Leo to take :further 
care for his own safety by again looking toward the approach-
ing truck during the crossing. 
For these reasons, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
that Dunham was negligent in failing to anticipate until the 
truck was some 60 to 80 feet from Leo that Leo was not 
going to yield the right of way. At that instant Dunham 
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reasonably may be said to have been confronted unexpectedly 
with a sudden and imminent peril, and a deliberately cal-
culated and cool choice was no longer possible. Accordingly, 
the record shows adequate basis for the instruction on immi-
nent peril. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I feel that there was no basis in the record for the instruc-
tion on imminent peril and that the giving of that instruction 
constituted reversible error within the meaning of article VI, 
section 41/z, of the Constitution of California. 
Defendant saw the plaintiff start to cross the highway when 
he was 300 feet away; he knew plaintiff was looking in the 
opposite direction, but he continued his approach at the same 
speed at which he had been proceeding. Not until he was 
from 60 to 80 feet away from the plaintiff did he decide that 
he was going to hit the plaintiff. At this time, he applied 
his brakes, called out, and swerved to the right. The evidence 
on the point of impact was in conflict and is, according to 
the majority opinion, "the subject of some uncertainty." De-
fendant realized that the plaintiff was unaware of his danger 
and yet he continued on his course, waiting for the plaintiff 
to look in his direction and stop, until it was too late to stop 
the truck. The defendant knew that the danger of the situa-
tion continued as long as the plaintiff was looking in the op-
posite direction and simply took the chance that plaintiff 
would look and see the truck approaching. The emergency 
was caused by defendant's negligence, and the doctrine has 
been held not available to one in such a position (Yates v. 
Marotti, 120 Cal.App. 710, 716 [8 P.2d 519] ; Dodds v. Gif-
ford, 127 Cal.App. 629, 632 [16 P.2d 279]; 65 C.J.S., p. 412). 
In Wright v. Sniffin, 80 Cal.App.2d 358 [181 P.2d 675], the 
doctrine of imminent peril was held inapplicable to the con-
duct of a driver who voluntarily and wrongfully placed him-
self in a dangerous position by attempting to pass a bicycle 
within 100 feet of an intersection. Defendant had seen the 
child on the bicycle while he was some distance away; had 
sounded his horn when he was within 200 feet of the child 
who apparently did not hear the warning. The defendant 
there then attempted to pass when the child veered her bicycle 
Dec. 1953] LEo v. DuNHAM 
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to the left and was instantly killed in the· resulting collision. 
There, as here, the defendant was at all times aware of the 
plaintiff's danger. There, as here, defendant assumed that 
the plaintiff would realize the danger. There, as here, the 
emergency was created by the defendant. 
In Fraser v. Stellinger, 52 Cal.App.2d 564, 567 [126 P.2d 
653], the defendant saw the plaintiff, who was riding a bi-
cycle, abqut 1,000 feet ahead of him. \Vhen he was about 
50 feet behind the plaintiff, he sounded his horn which was 
not heard by the plaintiff. ·when defendant was from 2 to 5 
feet to the rear of the bicycle, the plaintiff swerved his vehicle 
across the path of the defendant's truck. It was there held 
that the refusal of the trial court to give an instruction on 
the doctrine of sudden emergency was not error because the 
defendant had the rider in view for 1,000 feet as shown by 
his own testimony, and that "[f]urthermore the case was 
tried by the parties each claiming the accident was caused 
by the negligence of the other. The jury was fully instructed 
on the rules of law applicable to the respective theories of 
the alleged negligence of the defendant and the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff.'' 
In Rhodes v. Firestone l'ire etc. Co., 51 Cal.App. 569 [197 
P. 392], the doctrine of sudden emergency was held inappli-
cable where the driver of defendant's truck had ample time 
and space to avoid the collision with plaintiff's truck. 
In Stealey v. Chessurn, 123 Cal.App. 446 [11 P.2d 428], 
where defendant driver saw the plaintiff's decedent, a pedes-
trian, when she was from 6 to 10 feet ahead of him, the 
appellate court held it was reversible error to give an instruc-
tion on sudden emergency without the qualification that de-
fendant must have been free of negligence. 
In Gootar v. Levin, 109 CaLApp. 703 [293 P. 706], it was 
also held reversible error to give the instruction without the 
qualification; in Jones v. Heinrich, 49 Cal.App.2d 702 [122 
P.2d 304], the same rule was set forth. 
In the present case, the pleadings put in issue the questions 
of negligence and contributory negligence. There was no 
evidence to support an instruction which told the jury that 
" [a] person who, without negligence on his part, is suddenly 
and unexpectedly confronted with peril, arising from either 
the actual presence, or the appearance, of imminent danger 
to himself or to others, is not expected nor required to use 
the same judgment and prudence that is required of him 
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in the exercise of ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate 
moments .... '' (Emphasis added.) This instruction had no 
place in the case, and could have had no other effect than to 
confuse the jury. The majority in an endeavor to hold that 
no prejudicial error was present because of the giving of the 
instruction suggests that Dunham, ''therefore, reasonably 
might expect Leo to take further care for his own safety by 
again looking toward the approaching truck during the cross-
ing" and concludes that "it cannot be said, as a matter of 
law, that Dunham was negligent in failing to anticipate until 
the truck was some 60 to 80 feet from Leo that Leo was not 
going to yield the right of way." The fact remains that it 
cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant was not 
negligent. Plaintiff's failure to watch for approaching ve-
hicles goes to the issue of contributory negligence. In order 
for the doctrine to apply to defendant's conduct, there must 
have been no negligence, as a matter of law, on his part until 
he was confronted with the sudden emergency. Under the 
facts presented here, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, 
that defendant was exercising the care of the ordinarily pru-
dent man in assuming that plaintiff would turn and see his 
vehicle approaching. And, the fact does remain that defend-
ant was at all times aware that plaintiff was walking across 
the roadway without looking in his direction. As a result, 
there was no basis in the evidence of the instruction. Th:e 
giving of an instruction which is unsupported by the evidence 
has been held to constitute reversible error (Scandalis v. Jenny, 
132 Cal.App. 307 [22 P.2d 545] ; Davenport v. Stratton, 24 
Cal.2d 232 [ 149 P .2d 4] ) . The instruction on sudden emer-
gency, under the facts of this case, was inconsistent with the 
instruction on negligence as it applied to the defendant. It 
is impossible to ascertain here whether the jury found that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, or that defendant was 
free from negligence, or that defendant was excused from 
~ the consequences of his negligence because he was confronted 
\ with a sudden emergency. Instructions contradictory in 
. essential elements may warrant a reversal on the ground that 
it cannot be ascertained which instruction was followed by 
the jury (Carlson v. Shewalter, 110 Cal.App.2d 655 [243 
P.2d 549] ; Rackson v. Benioff, 111 Cal.App.2d 124 [244 
P.2d 9] ; Cannis v. Di Salvo Trucking Co., 111 Cal.App.2d 
893 [245 P.2d 365]). Without an instruction on sudden 
emergency ''a different verdict would not have been im-
probable" (Delzell v. Day, 36 Cal.2d 349, 351 [223 P .2d 625] ). 
Dec. 1953] PEOPLE v. BuiLDING MAINTENANCE ETC. AssN. 719 
[41 C.2d 719; 264 P.2d 31] 
I am in full accord with the views expressed in the learned 
and able opinion of the District Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division Three, prepared by Mr. Presiding 
Justice Shinn when this case was before that court * (Cal. 
App.) 248 P.2d 935. By unanimous decision of that court 
a reversal was ordered because "the instruction [sudden 
emergency] should not have been given and we have no way 
of knowing that the jurors were not misled, or that the verdict 
would have been the same if the instruction had not been 
given. (See Wright v. Sm:.ffin, supra, 80 Cal.App.2d 358, 
365 [181 P.2d 675] .) " 
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment. 
[S. F. No. 18345. In Bank. Dec. 11, 1953.] 
'l'HE PEOPLE, Appellant, v. BUILDING MAINTENANCE 
CONTRACTORS' ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., Re-
spondents. 
[1] Monopolies-Cartwright. Act-Agreements and Combinations 
Prohibited.-Agreement between some building maintenance 
contractors of city whereunder they not only agree to fix 
prices at which maintenance service will be provided, but also 
undertake to prevent competition among themselves by forcing 
their customers to pay higher prices if they seek to change 
maintenance contractors, constitutes a trust as defined by 
Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16720, relating to combinations in re-
straint of trade. 
[2] !d.-Cartwright Act-Validity.-Provisions of Bus. & Prof. 
Code, § 16723, exempting from operation of Cartwright Act 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.) any agreement, combina-
tion or association, the object and purpose of which are to 
conduct operations at a "reasonable profit" or to market at a 
"reasonable profit" those products which cannot otherwise be 
so marketed, are too vague and infect the whole statutory 
standard of conduct, since there is no common-law background 
or fund of common knowledge or experience that would allow 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Monopolies and Combinations, § 9 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Monopolies, Combinations and Restraints of Trade,§ 16 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6] Monopolies,§ 6; [2, 4, 5] Monopo-
lies,§ 5; [3] Statutes,§ 76; [7) Monopolies,§ 12; [8] Monopolies, 
§ 2. 
*A hearing was granted by the Supreme Court on Dec. 18, 1952. 
